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Modernneoclassical theories of the business cycle posit that -
aggregatefluctuations in consumption and employment are te consequence
ofdynamic optimizing behavior by economic agents who face no quantity
constraint.In this paper, we estimate an explicit model cf this type.
In particular, we assume that the observed fluctuations co:respond to the
decisions of an optimizing representative individual. This individual
hasa stable utility function which is additively separable over time but
not necessarily additivelyseparable in consumption and leisure. We
estimatethree first order conditions which represent three margins on
which the individual is optimizing. He can trade off present consumption
forfuture consumption, present leisure for future leisure and present
consumption for present leisure. Ourresultsshow that the aggregate
U.S. data are extremely reluctant to be characterized by a nodel of this
type. Not only are the overidentifying restrictions statistically
rejected but, in addition, the estimated utility function i.s often not
concave. Even when it is concave the estimates imply that either
consumption or leisure is an inferior good.
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Modern neoclassical theories of the business cycle are founded upon
the assumption that fluctuations in consumption and employment are the
consequence of dynamic optimizing behavior by economic agents whofate no
quantity constraints. In this paper, we present and estimate an explicit
operational model of an optimizing household. Our examination of post-
war aggregate data provides no support for these theories.
As in many recent studies of consumption and asset returns, we posit
that observed fluctuations can be modeled as the outcome of optimizing
decisions of a representative individual. The individual has a utility
function that is additively separable through time and faces in economic
environment where future opportunities are uncertain. Ourapproach
avoids the intractable problem of finding a closed form soluUon for the
representative individual's choices. Rather, we use the restrictions on
the data implied by the first—order conditions f or an optimum. The
estimation of these first—order conditions makesitpossible to recover
the structural parameters of the underlying utility function.
The three first—order conditions we consider represent three margins
on which the representative individual is optimizing. He cantrade—off
present and future consumption at a stochastic real interest rate
measured in terms of the consumption good. He cantrade—offpresent
leisure and future leisure at a stochastic real interest rate measured in
terms, of leisure. And he can trade—off present consumption and present
leisure at the real wage. Thus the approach taken here has the potential—2'-
-torecover parameters describing both consumption and labor supply
decisions.
The estimation technique we use is the nonlinear instrumental
variables procedure Hansen and Singleton (1981) suggest. It not only
produces consistent estimates of the relevant parameters, but also allows
us to test overidentifying restrictions implied by the theory. -
Throughoutthe study, we experiment with different measures of
-
consumption,different lists of instruments, and different frequency
data. We also try various functional forms for the underlying utility
function. In particular, we allow the utility function to be non—
separable in consumption and leisure. Such experimentation assures our
conclusions are robust to changes in the various auxiliary assumptions
necessary for implementation of the model.
We find that aggregate data is not readily characterized as ex post
realizations from a stochastic dynamic optimization. In particular, the
orthogonality conditions implied by theory are almost always rejected.
More importantly, the parameter estimates are usually highly implausible.
The estimated utility function is often not concave, which implies that
the representative individual is not at a maximum of utility, but at a
saddle—point or at a minimum. In addition, the estimates imply that
either consumption or leisure is an inferior good. We conclude that
observed economic fluctuations do not easily admit of a neoclassical
Interpretation.
Section II discusses the previous work on intertemporal substi-
tution. Section III develops the model, while Section IV discusses the—3—
data.Section V explains the estimation procedure, and section VI
presentsthe results. Section VI considers the implications of the
modelts failure for equilibrium theories of the business cycle, and
suggests directions for future research.
II.MOTIVATION
The major difference between modern neoclassical and traditional
Keynesian macro—economic theories is that the former regard observed
levels of employment, consumption and output as realizations from dynamic
optimizing decisions by both households andfirms,while the latter
regard them as reflecting constraints on firms and households. This
distinction is clearest in the case of labor supply decisions. In
classical macro—economic models, observed levels of labor supply
represent the optimizing choices of households given their perceptions of
the macro—economic environment. In Keynesian macro—models, employment is
frequently regarded as "demand determined" and fluctuations in employment
do not necessarily correspond to any change in desired labor supply.
Thegoal of the present paper is to examine the extent to which data
onconsumption and labor supply for the United States over the post—war
period are consistent with the hypothesis of continuous dynamic optimiza-
tion. At the outset, it is crucial to be clear about the limitations of
this empirical inquiry, or any investigation of this kin4. It is
impossible to test the general proposition about continuous optimization
discussed above. Only particular simple versions of the dynamic—4—
optimization problem can be considered. Any rejections of the models
estimated can be interpreted as a failure of the underlying theory or of
the particular parametrization of it which is tested. Of course, to the
extent that a theory fails when simply expressed, its utility as an
t
organizing frauiework for understanding economic events is called into
question.
Explanations of business cycles based on continuous dynamic
optimization differ in many respects. However, they share the notion
that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to changes in the
relative return from working currently and in the near future is likely
to be quite high. This would seem to be a necessary implication of any
such theory, since cyclical fluctuations in employment are large and the
long—run labor supply elasticity observed in cross—sections is typically
small. A central thrust of this paper is to examine empirically the
differential response of labor supply to permanent and transitory shocks
to real wages.
Recent research on consumption by Grossman and Shiller (1981),
Hansen and Singleton (1981), Hall (1978, 1981) and Mankiw (1981) shows
how it is possible to estimate directly the parameters of the
intertemporal utility function characterizing the behavior of the
representative individual. Hansen and Singleton (1981) and Mankiw (1981)
show how to test the overidentifying restrictions that are implied by the
hypothesis of continuous optimization of a stable additively separable
utility function. The major virtue of the approach pioneered by these
authors is that it permits utility function parameters to be estimated—5—
directly without requiring explicit solutions of the consumers' dynamic
optimization problem. Unfortunately, both Hansen and Singletonand
Mankiw report rejections of their estimated models.
This paper uses techniques similar to those developed in connection
with consumption to estimate the parameters of an intertemporal utility
function characterizing the labor supply behavior of the representative
consumer. This permits judgements to be made about the magnitude of the
key interteniporal elasticities. In addition, we can directly test the
hypothesis of dynamic optimization usinz the implied overidentifying
restrictions on the data. A major additional motivation for this
research is the rejection of the overidentifying restrictions in the
models Hansen and Singleton (1981) and Mankiw (1981) estimate. These
models all maintain the assumption that the marginal utility of
consumption depends only on the level of consumption. It is flatural to
entertain the hypothesis that the utility function is not separable so
that the marginal utility of consumption depends on the level of leisure.
The intertemporal utility functions we estimate allow this possibility..
There are at least two other motivations for estimating an
intertemporal utility function characterizing the behavior of both
consumption and leisure. As Feldstein (1978) demonstrates, the form of
this utility function determines the optimal structure of consumption and
income taxation. If consumption and leisure are additively separable,
optimal taxation involves a zero tax rate on capital income. More
generally, depending on the relative substitutability of present and
future consumption with leisure, a negative or positive tax rate Oncapital income is appropriate. While the absence of empirical evidence
on these crucial cross—effects has been widely noted, no empirical
estimates of the full intertemporal utility function are yet available.
A. second motivation for exploring intertemporal substitutability of
consumption and leisure is provided by models of the business cycle based
on imperfect information. These models which date from the contribution
of Lucas (1973) have in common a Lucas supply function of the form:
7 =a0+a1(pj?) a1 >0 (1)
This supply function states that when prices are unexpectedly high,
producers capitalize on their perceived transitory opportunity and
produce more output. While there is no logical flaw in this argument,
Friedman (1980) and Barro (1980) point out an equally compelling argument
in the opposite direction. When prices are transitorily high, the demand
for output should be low as consumers substitute their consumption
towards periods when output is less costly. Hence the sign of the
correlation between unexpected price shocks and output is theoretically
ambiguous. The validity of (1) as a reduced form description of
macroeconomicbehavior depends on its implicit premise that aggregate
supplyis more responsive to transitory shocks than is aggregate demand.
Comparison of the estimated interteniporal substitutability of consumption
and leisure can throw light on this issue. -—7—
Severalprevious papers attempt to measure the extent of
intertemporal substitution in labor supply using aggregate data. These
papers do not try to estimate directly the parameters of an underlying
utility function but attempt to estimate structural labor supply
equations. The results are mixed. Lucas and Rapping (1969) provide
estimates of an aggregate labor supply function which suggest very large
intertemporal substitution effects. Their results depend on the Koyck
lag—adaptive expectations scheme they use to nodel expectations of future
wages and prices. Altonji (1981) shows that when the Lucas—Rapping
equations are re—estimated using several different econometric techniques
to proxy rational expectations, the results are almost invariably
inconsistent with the intertemporal substitution hypothesis. Clark and
Summers (1982) also report econometric evidence inconsistent with the
substitution hypothesis, drawing on both aggregate time serieg and
informationon local labor markets.
Inan influentialrecent paper. Hall(1980) obtains estimates which
he views as providing support for the interteoporal substitution
hypothesis. However, it is very difficult to interpret his econometric




where w is the log of the real wage, and is the real interest rate.—8--
The motivation for this specification is unclear. The intertemporal
substitution hypothesis implies that labor supply should depend on the
relative return from working in period t and from working in period t+1.
This depends on the real wage in period t relative to the discounted
real wage in period t+l. The omission of expected future real wages from
(2) wakes it hard to interpret the resulting estimates.
These studies of intertemporal substitution share two major
difficulties. The first is the question of identification. Since the
labor supply schedule is likely to shift through time, it is
inappropriate to regard the real wage as an exogenous variable. The
problem is that satisfactory instruments are almost impossible to find.
Labor supply shocks are likely to affect most macroeconomic policy
variables. After a lengthy discussion of the pitfalls to be avoided in
selecting instruments for the estimation of (2), Hall settles on measures
of military spending as exogenous determinants of aggregate demand. But,
military spending is highly correlated with the size of the draft which
has a direct impact on labor supply. The problem of finding suitable
instruments becomes even more formidable when the supply equations
include expectational variables.
-
Thesecond difficulty involves the measurement of expectations. The
theory holds that labor supply should be a function of the distribution.
of the entire path of future real wages and interest rates, not just of
the first moments of those variables in the succeeding period.
Satisfactory proxies for these expectations are almost impossible to
develop. Problems of serial correlation and the length of the—9--
expectational horizon rule out the possibility of using instrumental
variable procedures of the type 4cCallum (1976) suggests to solve this
problem.
Hence, there is very little empirical evidence at the aggregate
level bearing on the importance of the intertemporal substitution -
effectsupon which modern neoclassical macroeconomics nodels are
premised. In recent papers, MaCurdy (l981a,b) examines intertemporal
substitution effects at the micro—econometric level. It might at first
seem that micro data provide a much firmer basis for estimating
intertemporal substitution effects, than do aggregate data. However, the
use of micro data involves serious problems. At the micro level, wages
and changes in wages are typically taken as exogenous. It is difficult
to justify this assumption. Individual wages presumably differ because
of differences in individual characteristics which affect their
productivity. It is difficult to see why these same characteris tics—
motivation, innate ability or whatever—should not also be associated with
the taste for working.
III. THEORY
This section describes the model to be estimated, To estimate the
model, it is necessary to make a number of auxiliary assumptions about
the behavior of consumers. These assumptions pertain to issues such as
the information set available to consumers and the functional form of
their utility functions. Tests of the model are also tests of these—10—
auxiliary assumptions, so they require careful attention. We make a
major effort to explore alternative sets of auxiliary assumptions to
insure the robustness of our conclusion regarding the economic issues of
major interest.
We examine a basic premise of many classical macro—economic models
that observed movements in per capita consumption and leisure correspond
to the behavior of a rational individual who derives pleasure from these
two goods and whose utility function is additively separable over time1
and is stationary. Such a utility function is:
VtEt u(c, L) (3)
•t=t
Here, Vt is expected utility at t, is the expectations operator
conditional on information available at t, p is a constant discount
factor, C is consumption of goods at ,Lis leisure atand U is a
function which is increasing and concave in its two arguments.
Given a specification of the budget constraint, and of the
conditional distributions of all future wages, prices and rates of return
an all assets, it would in principle be possible to use (3) to find
1The models of Lucas and Rapping (1970), Prescott and Mehra (1980),
Long and Plosser (1980) and King and Plosser (1981) for example exhibit
this feature. Some models such as those of Icydland and Prescott (1979)
rely on the absence of additive separability to generate intertemporal
substitution effects. We return to this possibility in the final section
of the paper.—U—.
consumers' choices of consumption and leisure at time t. In practice it
is almost impossible to conceive of all this information being available
to the econometrician. Even were it available, analytical solutions of
(3) do not exist even for very simple functional forms. Therefore,
following earlier work on consumption by Hankiw (1981), Hansen and
singleton (1981) and Hall (1982), we attempt to estimate directly the
form of U in (3) without specifying a model capable of predicting the
chosen levels of and Lt. We exploit the restrictions on the data
imposed by the first—order conditions necessary for the maximization of
(3) subject. to a budget constraLnt.
We assume the representative individual has access to some financial
assets which can be both bought and sold. In addition, he has access
spot markets in which labor and consumption are freely traded. As long
as the optimum path lies in the interior of the budget set, wg can use
simple perturbation arguments to establish certain characteristics of
this optimal path. At any point along an optimal path, the
representative individual cannot make himself better off by foregoing one
unit of consumption or leisure at time t and using the proceeds to
purchase any other good at any other point in time. In particular, when
the representative individual is following his optimal path of











Here, P is the nominal price of a unit of C, W is the wage the
individual receives when he foregoes one unit of Lt and r is the nominal
return from holding a security between t and ti-i.2
The static first—order condition (s) says that the individual cannot
make himself better off by foregoing one unit of consumption (thereby
decreasing his utility by oU/oC) and spending the proceeds on
of leisure each of which he values at oU/bL. The reverse
transaction is also unable to increase his utility. Note that the model
implies that equation Cs) holds exactly. Since we assume at time t the
consumer knows the real wage he choses consumption and leisure to
equate the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution.
The Euler equation for consumption (EC) states that along an optimal
path the representative individual cannot alter his expected utility by
giving up one unit of consumption in period t, investing its cost in any
available security, and consuming the proceeds in period t+l. The
utility cost of giving up a unit of consumption in period t is given by
P
OU/bC. The expected utility gain is given by EpbU/bC1•p (1 + re).
t+l
Equating the cost and gain £ row this perturbation yields the first—order
condition (EC). It is important to be clear about the generality of this
result. The condition (EC) will hold even if labor supply cannot be
more than one security is available, (EC) and (EL) should hold
for all securities which canbefreely bought and sold.—13—
freely chosen, and trading is not possible in many asset, as long as
some asset exists which is either held in positive amounts or for which
borrowing is possible.
Finally, the Euler equation for leisure (EL) asserts that along an
optimal path the representative individual cannot improve hiswelfareby
working one hour more at t, (thereby losing bU/aLt of utility) and using
his earnings to purchase a security whose proceeds will be used to buy
W (l+r )
back of leisure at t+l in all states of nature. Such an invest—
t+l
-
wentwould increase expected utility by EpEôU/bL1] W(l + r)/W+1.
Therefore(EL) ensures that this expression is equal to or/oLt.
If the static first order condition (5)heldexactly one of (EC) and
(EL) would be redundant. We can see this by replacing oUl3Cand
in(EC) using (5).This procedure produces (EL). However,
since(5)isunlikely to hold exactly in the data we use the information
inall three of these first—order conditions to estimate theparameters
ofthe utility function (i).
3Even if (s) doesn't hold exactly, the residual in one of the Euler
equations is equal to the residual in the other Euler equation times a
deterministic function of the residual of (5)- at t divided by a
deterministic function of the residual of S at t+l. The fact that there
is no linear relationship between the three residuals suggests, as will
be argued below, that the three equationsshould be estimated
simultaneously.—14—
In order to estimate the instantaneous utility function U, it is





This utility function which is similar to MaCurdy's (1981) has, as
special cases, an additively separable utility function in consumption
and leisure, (y0);4 a CES form for the ordinal utility function
characteristizing single period decision making, (a);5 and a
logarithmic utility function, (ol, f3=l,yO).This functional form also
provides for the possibility of differential degrees of interteinporal
substitution in consumption and leisure. This is easiest to see when
yO, so thatrepresents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
4This is the utility function considered by Altonji (1981) and
Blinder (1978) among others.
51n fact we consider a slight variation of (4) when we impose a.
This variation which has been used by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) and
Lipton and Sachs (1981) is given by: [C +d •Thisutility
function has the advantage that a and y are readily interpretable. 1/a
is the elasticity of substitution of consumption for leisure while l/y is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the composite good
[c +d—15-S
consumption andrepresents the corresponding elasticity for leisure.6
Previous work on intertemporal substitution in consunption estimates
the condition (EC) maintaining the hypothesis that yO. Even if this
supposition is correct, it is clear that this is not an efficient
estimation procedure since it neglects the information coitained in.(S).
Civen the failures of overidentifying restrictions in the previous
research, it seems worthwhile to entertain the hypothesis that the
marginal utility of consumption depends also on the level of leisure
enjoyed by consumers.
Below we describe how to statistically test the orthogonality
restrictions implied by the hypothesis of dynamic optimization. Here it
is useful to describe how the parameter estimates can be used to examine
the issues of economic interest. An argument can be made that this
provides a more satisfactory way of testing the relevance of the model
than is provided by statistical tests of overidentifying restrictions.
The model is at best an approximation to reality. Therefore, with enough
data the point hypotheses corresponding to the overidentifying
restrictions will be rejected at any given critical value. On this view,
testing these hypotheses sheds as much light on the quantity of data
available as on the model's validity as an approximation of reality. The
last question can only be answered by estimating parameters which
correspond to magnitudes relevant for assessing the reasonableness of the
theory. In any event, this methodological issue is moot in the context
6This elasticity is simply the percentage change in the ratio of
consumption (or leisure) at t+l to consumption (or leisure) at t over the
percentage change in the real interest rate Pjl+r)/P+1 (or
Wt(l+rt)IWt+l). Elasticities like these have been studied by Hall (1981)
and Hansen and Singleton (1981).—16—
of this paper, since both the statistical tests of the model and the
parameter estimates point to a common conclusion.
We assess the estimates in two ways: by checking that they obey the
restrictions on utility functions implied by economic theory, and more
importantly by examining the implied values of short and long run
elasticities. Theory requires that the function U be concave; otherwise,
the first—order conditions corresponds to a local minimum or saddle point
rather than a local maximum. We check this by verifying that the matrix
of second derivatives of U is negative definite at all points in our
sample.
In informal discussion of the importance of interteraporal
substitution, it is often pointed out that the responses of consumption
and leisure to temporary changes in prices and wages must be different
from the response to permanent changes in these magnitudes. However, the
actual responses are impossible to compute without first solving the
stochastic control problem whose objection is (3). Instead, we compute
some simple measure of responses of consumption and leisure. We derive
all measures under the assumption that individuals face a deterministic
environment.
The "short—run" elasticities illustrate the changes in consumption
and leisure at t in response to temporary changes in WtJand r. We
derive these elasticities under the assumption that the effects of these
changes on consumption and leisure after t can be neglected. These
effects are all mediated through the change in total wealth at t+l that
results f row the changes in W, and r. Insofar as this change in—17—
wealth mustbevery small compared to the wealth of the individual at t+1
if he still has long to live, this approximation is valid. The "short—













If one were interested in the long—run effects of a change in the
income tax on consumption and hours worked, the elasticities in (5) would
not be very informative. Instead, one would be interested in a measure
of the extent to which consumption and labor supply is affected on
average over the individual's lifetime. One simple measure of this long—
run response is obtained from assuming that the individual has no
nonlabor income, that both the real interest rate in terms of leisure and
P(1+r) W(1+r)
the one in terms of consumption ( and )areequal to 1/p
t+l t+l
and that the real wage is constant. Then, the individual plans to—18—
maintain a constant level of consumption and of leisure over his
lifetime. His plan is consistent with a static budget constraint which




where N is his endowment of leisure. Totally differentiating (6) and (8)
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IV.DATA
Estimation of the parameters of (4) requires several choices about
the data to be used. These choices reflect auxiliary assumptions which
must be made in order to test the hypothesis of market clearing and -
dynamicoptimization. These auxiliary assumptions are of pivotal—19'-
-importancebecause the estimation results depend on their validity as
well as on the basic theoretical notions being examined. This subsection
describes the assumptions underlying the estimates in the paper.
The first—order conditions (5), (EC), and (EL) characterize
optimization for a single individual with a given utility function.
Their application to aggregate data is more problematic. Rubinstein.
(1975) presents results showing that if all individuals have identiëal,
separable utility functions, and if all risky assets including human
capital are freely traded, the model we consider here can be rigorously
justified as applied to aggregate data. To state these conditions is to
recognize their falsity. They imply that the consumption of all
individuals should be perfectly correlated. Hall and Nishkin (1981)
present data indicating that, at least using one taasure of consumption,
•there is only negligible correlation between the consumption of different
individuals.7 It is standard in studying consumption to model per capita
consumption as if it were chosen by a representative consumer. We follow
the standard convention of using consumption and labor input per member
of the adult population. As Summers (1982) points out, the rationale for
this procedure is unclear. If it is appropriate to give individuals
under 16 zero weight, presumably because they consume little, might it
not also be appropriate to weight individuals of different ages according
7Grossman and Shiller present another aggregation theorem. However
their theotm cannot be used to rigorously justify the estimation of a
representative consumer's utility function as is done here. Their
results are only local and so do not apply over the discrete intervals
which generate the data, unless the utility function has a special form,
different train the one assumed here. Furthermore, their theorem assumes
interior solutions for each agent, which is unrealistic for leisure.
.4—20—
to their consumption or labor supply in constructing per—capita
variables? This approach is taken in Summers (1982) where it has a
significant impact on the results. It is not pursued here because of the
difficulty in finding a population index which is appropriate for both
consumption and leisure.
The choice of the measure of consumption is fundamental. Herethe
distinction between consumption and consumption expenditure is crucial.
Even goods classified as non—durables in the National Income Accounts
have a durable component, as has been pointed out by Nankiw (1982). The
pen with which this sentence is written was purchased nine months ago.
Clothing is another obvious example of a durable good which is officially
classified as a non—durable. Even services, are in many ways like durable
goods. Utility comes not from trips to the doctor but from the stream of
good health which they provide. Vacations are taken in part for the
memories they create. Thus all of the available data pertain to
consumption expenditure not actual consumption and so are not strictly
appropriate. We use as our measure of consumption alternatively real
expenditures on non—durables and non—durables and services as reported in
the National Income and Product Accounts. The NIPA price deflators are
used to measure prices.
The choice of a consumption concept poses a second fundamental
issue, that of separability of the utility function. Both measures of
consumption with which we experiment in this study can only proxy part of
total consumption since the expenditure and the services from durable
goods are completely excluded. Implicitly each of our alternative—21—
specifications impose the assumption that the excluded fnms of
consumption eater the utility function in additively se;arable ways.
This assumption which has been maintained in all the earlier work on
consumption is obviously problematic. Consider freezers and food, or
cars and gasoline. An alternative defense of using a subset of
consumption as a proxy for aggregate consumption is to rely on Nicks or
Leontief aggregation.8 If the relative price of different types of
consumption is fixed and the utility function is homothetic, or if
different goods are consumed in fixed proportions, any subset of
aggregate consumption can be used as a proxy for total consumption. The
data do not provide much support for either of these assumptions.
The measurement of leisure also poses problems. Scnewhat
arbitrarily we specify that the representative individual has a time
endowment of 7 x 16112 hours a week. We compute leisure by
subtracting per—capita total hours worked by the civilian labor force
from this time endowment. In principle, it would be possible to estimate
econometrically the size of the time endowment. In practice, this
parameter is difficult to estimate so we constrain it a priori. The
specification we adopt here based on total hours worked is open to the
serious criticism that it does not distinguish between changes in the
number of persons working and in average hours per worker. The former -
- posesserious problems for the model since the first—order conditions (S)
81f reliance is placed on Leontief aggregation, there is still a
problem of measuring real returns, unless a price index for all
consumption is employed.—22—
and (EL) need not hold for individuals whose labor supply is at the
corner solution of zero hours worked.
The measurement of the-price of leisure, the wage, also involves a
choice between less than Zully satisfactory alternatives. The series we
use refers to average total compensation of employees in the non—farm
business sector. We calculate after tax wages by using a time series of
marginal tax rates on labor income, measured as the sum of Federal Income
taxes,9 Social Security taxes and state income taxes. The problems with
this measure of wages include its partial coverage, and its failure to
include some forms of compensation such as the accrual of Social Security
and private pension benefits. Perhaps more seriously, the extent to
which market wages reflect the marginal return from working has been
BeriouBly questioned. Hall (1980) argues that certain features of the
economy's cyclical behavior canbeexplained by assuming wages do not
reflect true compensation for working on a period by period basis, even
though the economy always attains the Walrasian equilibrium level of
employment.
-
Thefinal data decision is the choice of an asset return r. We
experimente with both estimates of the before and after tax Treasury Bill
interest rate. As a crude approximation, we assume a 30 percent tax rate
on interest income. Since the results are fairly similar, only the after
tax results are reported. This choice is appropriate for recent years
when savings instruments paying near market rates of return were widely
9The data on average Federal marginal tax rates came from Seatar
(1981).—23—
available.Its appropriateness is less clear during the bulk of the
sample period when interest rate ceilings constrained the rates
obtainable by most individuals. The extent to which Installment credit
rates match with the treas.ury bill rate is not clear. Su2xners (1982)
finds very similar results in a study of fluctuations in consumption
which uses both time deposit and treasury bill yields. The time deposit
rate is not used here because data are not available over a large enàugh
period.
A final issue to be addressed is the appropriate period of
observation. As is by now well known, the use of discrete time data can
lead to biases if the data are generated by a continuous time process.
In particular, time averages of a random walk will not have serially
uncorrelated increments. There is the additional problem that the link
between consumption and consumption expenditure is likely to be better
at lower than at higher frequencies.
Becauseof the latter problem we reject the common view that models
of this type should be estimated with data for as short of a period as
possible.In addition the assumption of additive separability is more
realistic for large period lengths. We use two different procedures.
The first, which we employ with apology but without excuse, is to use
seasonally adjusted quarterly data. There is clearly a serious risk that
• the averaging involved in seasonal adjustment disturbs the results. The
second procedure involves using only data from the fourth quarter of each
year.The interval betweenobservationsreduces time aggregation
problems.In addition, the gap between observations may reduce the—24—
problems which come f row the use of expenditure to proxy consumption.
Finally, the use of data £ row only one quarter may reduce seasonality
problems.
We use three lists of instruments for every specification we
estimate. List A includes a constant, the rates of inflation beuJeen t—2
and t—l and between t—5 andt—l,the nominal rate of return between t—l
and t and the holding period yield between t—5 and t—1. List B includes
a constant and the levels of consumption, the interest rate, leisure,
prices and wages at t—l and t—2. Instead list C includes the values of
these variables at t and t—l. Therefore, list C allows us to check
whether the estimates worsen when current variables are included as
instruments.
V. ESTIMATION METHOD
We estimate the parameters a, p,dand ''ofthe function U given by
(4). This is done by fitting the implied first order conditions (S),
(EC) and (EL) to U.S. data. Hansen and Singleton (1981) suggest thatthe
theoretically correct method for estimating Euler Equations like (EC) and
(EL) is a nonlinear instrumental variables procedure. The rationale for
this procedure can be stated as follows: The equations (EC) and (EL)
• state that the expectation at t of a function of variables at t and (t+l)
•is zero. Hence they can be written as Eh(X+19) —0,where h is a
vector function, includes variables at t and t+l and e is a vector
of parameters. However, this states that the expectation of the product—25—
of any variable in the information set at t with the actual values of
h(X+ie) must be zero. This suggests as a natural estimator for 0 the
value of 9 which minimizes an appropriately weighted sum of the squares
of the product of instruments at t with h(X+j.e). In particular, Hansen
and Singleton (1981) propose that the value of 0 be chosen which
minimizes:
Jh' ZHZ' Li (8))
where h is the qT x 1 vector of actual values of h(X+ii0), q is the
number of equations, T the number of observations, H is a weighting




where there are as many blocks of Z as there are equations and Z is the T
x m matrix of observations on instruments.10Here, m is the number of
instruments. Hansen and Singleton (1981) derive the weighting matrix
which produces the smallest assymptotic standard errors for e even when
10Note that the product of the instruments and the residual of (EL)
at t is not a linear function or products of the instruments with the
residuals of the other two equations. Therefore,if only two equatipns
were estimated the results would depend on which two were chosen.
Therefore, we have chosen instead to estimate all three equations at once
with a common set of instruments.—26—
the h's are heteroskedastic conditional on the Z's as long as they are
not unconditionally heteroskedastic. For simplicity, we assume instead
that the h's are also conditionally homoskedastic. This leads to.
consistent estimates although the standard errors are inconsistent if the
assumption of homoskedasticity is wrong. In the case we consider, the
•optimal"H reduces to the familiar three stage least squares formula:
ii [S1R(z'z) ]
whereS is the covariance matrix of the h's of different equations. Here
the h's are the fitted values of Ii after a two: stage least squares
estimation procedure whichminiunizes (8) using I g (Z'Z)1 as the
weighting matrix.
Hansen (1981) also shows that the minimized value of .J when the
"optimal" H is used is assymptotically distributed as 2 with degrees of
freedom equal to (qm —r)where r is the number of parameters that are
estimated. This provides a very simple test of the overidentifying
restrictions.11 These restrictions simply require that the addition of
extra instruments shouldn't increase the value of J very much. This is
so because, according to the model, at the true e, the expectation of the
cross product of any new instrument and h is zero.
'1Hansen's theorem strictly applies only to situations in which the
variables are stationary and ergodic. This requirement is probably met
byour first list or instruments while it is less likely to old for lists
8 and C.—27—
The main problem with using any variable in the information set at t
as an instrument is that this procedure is appropriate onlywhen the sole
reason for h to differ from zero is that, at t+l, agentsdiscover new
information about prices and incomes.(f this were indeed the only
source of uncertainty in the economy then the staticcondition (5) wuld
hold exactly; there is no reason for the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption for leisure to be different from the real wage. However,it
is inevitable that any empirical estimate of (S) will not fit perfectly.
Any of the natural explanations or this residual seen toinvalidate the
use as instruments of all the variables known at t. Such explanations
include the presence of errors of measurement of the variables, errprs of
specification, the presence of nominal contracts and the absenceof full
information by the agents at t about variables which occur at t. These.
last two explanations for the residual in (S) appear to be cQnsistent
with assuming that all three first order conditions hold in expectation
with respect to a weaker conditioning set than the one Hansen and
singleton (1981) suggest.
In particular, in a model like that of Fischer (1977) these
conditions might hold for every agent when the expectation is taken
conditional on the variables known when the nominal contract which
prevails at t is signed. Likewise, in a model like that of Lucas (1973)
they would hold when the conditioning set is the set of economywide
variables known by agents at t. However, the aggregation over agents who
signed contracts at different dates or over agents who have different
private information might present serious difficulties. In any event,—28—
these considerations suggest that an appropriate estimatQr of a, p,dand
y can be obtained by estimating the systemof equations (5), (EL) and
(EC) by nonlinear three stage least squares where the instruments are
variables whose realizations occur before t.Infact, we compare the
results of using current and lagged instruments with those of usitig only
lagged instruments.
VI. RESULTS
We begin by estimating the three first—order conditions separately,
since each of these equations requires a different set of assumptions
regarding which markets clear. We then estimate the entire system of
equations. These system estimates require that the individual does not
face a quantity constraint in any market. Because our preliminary
results using only fourth quarter data are essentially identical to those
using quarterly data, we report, only the latter.
ThefirstEuler equation (EC) requires that theexpectationof the
product of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in tand
consumption in t+l with the real interest rate equals unity. This
condition holds so long as the individual is not constrained either in
the goods market or in the capital market. In particular, (EC) does not
embody any assumption regarding the determination of the level of
employment.
Table 1 contains the estimates of (EC) imposing additive
separability between consumption and leisure (y0)asis done implicitly—29—
Table1
Estimates of Euler Equation for Consumption (EC) Separable Case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption
measure ND ND ND ND+S ND+S ND+S
InstrumentList A B C A B C
a .234 .174 .512 .330 .092 .333
(.219)(.199)(.193)(.237)(.209)(.182)
p_i .997 .997 .996 .996 .997 .996
(.001)(.001)(.001)(.001)(.001)(.001)
Concave? YES. YES YES YES YES YES
J 25.48 43.06 35.43 24.8 47.41 44.78
Critical J* at 1% 11.34 21.66 21.66 11.34 21.66 21.66
Standard errors are in parentheses.—30—
in earlier work. The estimates of a are positive, as is necessary for
concavity. They vary between .09 and .51, and center at about .3. Other
studies estimate this Euler equation in the additively separable case and
generally report higher estimates of a. Hansen and Singleton (1981) find
a to be about .8, Summers (1982) about 3, Mankiw (1981) about 4, and Hall
(1981) about 15. In all cases, the overidentifying restrictions are
clearly rejected, indicating that the orthogonality conditions upon which
these estimates are premised do not hold. This is precisely the same
rejection Etansen and Singleton (1981) and Mankiw (1981) report. Beyond
the variations in the measure of consumption and the instrument list
àhown in the table, we also experimented with the use of pre—tax returns,
with little impact on the results.
The failure of the overidentifying restrictions suggests that it is
likely that parameter estimates will be sensitive to the choice of
instruments lists. In a-different context, Rausman (1978) shows that the
difference between estimates obtained with different instrument lists can
be used as a basis for an exogeneity test. If adding instruments changes
the results by "too much" the hypothesis that the additional instruments
are exogenous can be rejected. We suspect, but have not been able to
prove) that the exogeneity tests used here can be given an interpretation
as Hausman tests.
Table 2 contains the estimates of (EC) that allow non—separability
between consumption and leisure. The standard errors of the parameter
estimates are extremely high. In particular, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of additive separability between consumption and leisure
(yO). This is not surprising, as the difficulty of testing separability—31—
Table 2
Estimates of Euler Equation for Consumption (EC) Nonseparable Case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption ND ND ND ND+S ND+S ND+S
measure
Instrument List A B C A B C
a 1.118 .257 .375 —.204 .147 .799
(118.13) (1.568) (1.302) (15.94) (4.112) (.393)
p —45.827 151.9 150.99 —71.39 134.5 —41.858
(12839.8) (472.3) (612.97) (872.6 )(248.95)(800.2)
T —4.730 .098 .086 —.537 .1780 .034
(1299.3) (1.592) (1.329) (21.8) (3.757) (.549)
d 1.383 280.8 280.0 301.2 264.3 284.2
(332.3)(3480.0) (3364.8) (23595.)(2840) (4454.)
p_i .999 .997 .997 1.001 .996 .993
(.048) (.001) (.001) (.015) (.002) (.002)
Concave? NO YES YES NO YES NO
.1 29.23 24.63 33.51 27.50
Critical J*
at 1% 16.81 16.81 16.81 16.81
Standard errors are in parentheses.—32—
restrictions is well known. Alternative values of a, fl, andy have very
similar implications for the short—run and long—run behavioral
elasticities. For example, if d is close to zero, it will be impossible
to separately identify a and y. Furthermore, we continue to reject the
overidentifying restrictions. Thus, the rejection of the model hansen
and Singleton (1981) and Mankiw (1981) report cannot be attributed to
their maintained hypothesis of separability between consumption and
leisure.
The second Euler equation (EL) specifies that the product of the
marginal rate of substitution of leisure in tandleisure in tEl and the
real interest rate in terms of leisure has an expectation of 1. This
condition is premised upon the absence of qyantity constraints both in
the capital market and in the labor market.
Table 3 presents the estimates of (EL) in the additive separable
case. The estimates ofoften have the wrongsign(negative), rejecting
the concavity restriction. Note that when the concavity restriction is
violated, the estimated parameters imply a utility function whose maximum
is given by a corner solution, or which does not exist. Obviously the
data decisively reject either possibility. In principle, concavity of
the utility should be imposed, as the likelihood of observed consumption
and leisure is zero if the utility function is not concave. In practice,
imposing this restriction is difficult. Therefore, it is hard to
interpret in a very meaningful way the standard errors or the parameters
in the case where the concavity restrictions are rejected. Nonetheless,
the data indicates no clear relation between the quantity of leisure and
the relative price of present versus future leisure. This result casts—33-.
Table 3
Estimates of Euler Equation for Leisure (EL) Separable Case
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument List A B C




Concave? NO NO YES
J 8.47 15.75 21.7
Critical J*
at 1% 11.35 21.66 21.66
Standard errors are in parentheses.—34—
Table4
Estimates of Euler Equation for Leisure (EL) Nonseparable Case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption ND ND ND ND+S ND+S ND+S
measure
InstrumentList A B C A B C
a 2.286 —.227 1.6332 1.696 1.970 2.947
(5.490 (39.4) (35.9) (2.975)(2.434) (64.315)
p 8.753 —1.032 .1837 13.083 7.23 .481
(22.78) (4.504) (52.0) (19.374) (11.49) (2344.9)
—18.42 —.318 —.466—21.457—18.8 —9.678
(217.3) (9.155) (30.4)(143.31) (110.1) (1754.)
d .528 1.132 .510 1.355 .4)8 .021
(7.763)(344.3) (118.7) (13.5) (3.305) (121.9)
p_i .995 .995 .994 1.0002 .996 .994
(.001) (.0001) (.0009) (.008) (.002) (.002)
Concave? NO NO NO NO NO BARELY1
J 8.26 21.63 5.76 25.47
Critical
at 1% 16.81 16.81 16.81 16.81
Standard errors are in parentheses.
'The determinant of the matrix of second partials of U is negative.
but very close to zero, making inversion of the matrix, and thus
computation of elasticities, impossible.—35—
serious doubt on the preise of most classicAl macro—economic models that
observed labor supply re?resents unconstrained choices given perceived
opportunities.Note especially that the results are not very sensitive
to the choice of instruent list. In particular, the use of lagged
instruments to capture the possibilityof imperfect information has
littleeffect on the resilts.
Table 4 presents the estimates of (EL) that allow non—separability.
The standard errors are huge, and thus do not reject separability. The
estimated utility function is almost never concave. Hence, the failure
reported above for the separable case cannot be attributed to the then
maintained hypothesis of separability.
Thethirdconditioi Cs), whichequatesthe marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure to the real tage, is the
crucial test of labor—narket—clearing. Unlike either of the other first—
order conditions, this static relation does not rely upon the assumed
absence of liquidity—constraints. It relies only upon the ability of the
individual to trade—off consumption and leisure within a single period.
In other words, it assuzes only that there is no quantity constraint
either in the goods market or in the labor market. Since consumers are
generally not constrained in the goods market, this equation should hold
so long as observed employment lies on the labor supply curve. Recall
that the underlying model also predicts that (5) should hold exactly.
Table 5 presents the estimates obtained from the estimation of CS),
which has the same form for both the separable and nonseparable utility—36—
Table 5
Estimates of Static Condition (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption ND ND ND ND+S ND+S ND+S
measure
Instrument List A C A B C
a 1.873 2.377 4.636 3.694 3.639 2.789
(.118) (.053) (.040) (.035) (.032)(.032)
p .018 —1.107—8.042 —5.426—16.231 —.212
(1.417) (1.097) (5.306) (10.038)(9.324) (4.235)
J 63.98 118.05118.97 87.91 118.25121.86
Critical 3*
at 1% 9.21 20.09 20.09 9.21 20.09 20.09
Standard errors are in parentheses.—37.-
functions. In almost every case, the estimate of a is positive, and the
estimate of 13 is negative. We find these signs for different instrument
lists, for different measures of consumption, for different frequency
data, and for different estimation periods. Although not displayed,
these signs also emerge when Cs) is estimated in first differences.
Altonji (1981) also estimates a version of (5) and reports estimates of a
and 13 with these signs. The data inescapably point to at least one
robust result. For any given real wage, consumption and leisure move in
opposite directions in response to other exogenous changes.
This result provides powerful evidence against the hypothesis that
observed labor supply behavior can be described as resulting from -
continuousmaximization of a stable additively separable intertemporal
utility function. The estimated utility function is extremely
implausible, as can be illustrated easily. holding the real .wage
constant, consider an increase in non—labor income, If a and .13 have
opposite signs, then either consumption or leisure must fall. That is,
since consumption and leisure move in opposite directions for any given
real wage, one must be inferior if the movements represent voluntary
maximizing behavior.
These results are due to the fact that over the business cycle
consumption and leisure move in opposite directions. At the same time,
we simply do not observe at the aggregate level the procyclical movements
in the real wage which would make this behavior rational for households.
We next estimate the three first—order conditions jointly as a




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption ND ND ND ND+S NDI-S ND+S
measure
Instrument List A B C A B C
a 1.45 1.535 1.570 .793 .889 .904
(.038) (.025) (.026) (.017) (.015) (.016)
p —1.181 —.704 —.236 —3.030 —1366 —1.100
(.799) (-.389) (.407) (.470) (.284) (.290)
p_i .994 .994 .994 .994 .993 .993
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0004) (.0004)
Concave? NO NO NO NO NO NO
.1 30.67 55.23 56.51 50.75 109.76 125.09
Critical J*
at 1% 24.73 49.59 49.59 24.73 49.59 49.59




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption NI) ND ND ND+S ND+S ND+S
measure
Instrument List A B C A B C
a 1.407 1.680 1.713 .789 .889 .928
(.030) (.033) (.035) (.017) (.014)(.018)
p —4.937 —.340 .158 —3.637 —1.718 —.688
(.549) (.414) (.493) (.464) (.281)(.324)
—6.452 .050 .321 —2.720 —2.716 .080
(1.791) (.035) (1.178) (.967) (.602)(.176)
d .843146.40616.540 8.297 —.640 114.612
(.448) (71.198) (68.970) (4.112) (.776)(310.028)
p_i .997 .994 .993 .999 .997 .993
(.001) (.0005) (.001) (.001) (.001)(.0005)
Concave? NO YES YES NO NO YES
J 21.308 41.91 47.23 31.45 99.07 128.24
Critical J*
at it 21.67 46.96 46.96 21.67 46.96 46.96




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption ND ND ND ND+S ND+S ND+S
measure
Instrument List A B C A B C
a 1.506 1.554 1.608 .948 1.005 1.012
(.030) (.022) (.028) (.019) (.019)(.019)
p_i .993 .993 .993 .993 .99.1 .993
(.001) (.001)(.001) (.001) (.001)(.001)
Concave? YES YES YES YES YES YES
J 38.21 66.82 59.44 61.65 119.06117.81
Critical J*
at 1% 26.22 50.89 50.89 26.22 50.89 50.89
Standard errors are in pareatheses.—41—
Table9
System Estimates Imposing a =
Non—SeparableCase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption ND ND ND ND+S ND-I-S ND+S
measure
Instrument ListA B C A B C
a 1.635 1.600 1.648 1.722 1.079 1.019
(.112) (.023) (.023) (.040) (.026)(.027)
—3.486 —.563 1.068 —7.757 —1.092 .892
(2.246) (.557) (.599) (5.554) (.776)(.639)
d .730 .447 .112 .226 .403 —.613
(.381) (.115) (.209) (.100) (.242) (1.496)
.996 .995 .994 1.002 .999 .995
(.001)
-
(.0001)(001) (.005) (.001) (.001)
Concave? NO NO YES NO NO NO
3 18.80 53.83 63.26 53.38 151.35110.53
Critical 3*
at 1% 23.21 48.28 48.28 23.21 48.28 48.28
Standard errors are in parentheses.—42—
individual must face no quantity constraint in any market.
Table 6 presents the system estimates in the separable case. For
both consumption measures and for all instrument lists, the estimate of a
is positive and the estimate of pisnegative. Thus, the estimited
utility function is not concave. The data is not consistent with
continous dynamic maximization of a utility function that is additively
separable in consumption and leisure.
-
Table7 presents the system estimates for the non—separable case.
The estimated utility function is concave for only half of the estimates.
In most of the concave cases, a and phaveopposite signs, implying that
either consumption or leisure is an inferior good. In addition, we
reject the overidentifying restrictions, for all concave estimates. Thus,
the data does not readily produce reasonable parameter estimates of the
representative individual's utility function. This result provides
little support to business cycle models that posit continuous dynamic
maximization and the absence of quantity constraints.
We next estimate the system imposing the constraint a". The
separable estimates are in Table S. The estimate of a is consistent
across instrument lists: 1.5 for nondurables, and 1.0 for nondurables
and services. The overidentifying restrictions are always rejected. The
nonseparable estimates are in Table 9. The estimated utility function is
usually notconcave.The overidentifying restrictions almost always can
be rejected, while the null hypothesis of separability cannot be
rejected.
Various elasticities are presented in Table 10 for those—43—
nonseparable estimates that imply a concave utilityfunction.8 Since the
estimates of the utility function parameters vary greatly,the estimated
elasticities also vary greatly. The long—run elasticityof consutiiptloa
with respect to the wage is approximately .6, and the long—runelasticity
of leisure with respect to the wage is .26, implying abackward—bending
long—run labor supply curve.
8These elasticities are computed using data corresponding to the
first quarter of 1980. A problem arises from the fact thatall three
equations have a residual in this period. Thisresidual is Ignored in
our calculations which use the actual valuesfor C, L, P, J and r on both
sides of (5) and (7). Alternatively, we could have changed someof these
variables to make (S), (EC) and (EL) hold exactly and then computedthe
elasticities.—44—
Table 10
Elasticities Implied by the Estimates
Table and Column
of Estimates 2.2 2.3 2.5 7.2 7.3 7.6 9.3
Short—Run Elasticities
C with respect to P —3.1 —2.4 —3.4 —.61 —.60 —1.1 —2.7
C with respect to bY .0055 .0047 .0061 —.64 .55 1.8 .22
C with respect to i+r—3.1 —2.3 —3.4 —.045 —.045 —.72 —2.5
L with respect to P .0015 .00086 .0038 .0005—.l8. .21 .273
L with respect to W —.0027 —.0028 —.0035 —.36 —.25 .99 —4.2
L withrespectto 1+r —.0013 —.0020 —.00030—.36 —.22 —.99 3.9
Long—Run Elasticities
C with respect to W/P .54 .61 .89
Lwithrespect to WIP .26 .26 .25—45—
Probably the inost.important elasticity for evaluating the
intertemporal substitution hypothesis is the short—run elasticity of
leisure with respect to the current wage. This elasticity varies from
—.0027 to —4.2 across estimates. This implies a short—run labor supply
elasticity between .01 and 17, since leisure is roughly four times labor
supply. Note that the elasticity of leisure with respect to changeè in
the interest rate is in all cases butoneessentially identical to the
e1aticity with respect to the wage. Hence it too fluctuates widely over
different estimates. Moreover, the short run elasticity of consumption
with respect to changes in prices varies from —.6 to —3.4. It is not
surprising, given the reluctance of the data to be characerized by the




Theempirical results reported in this paper are consistently
disappointing. The overidentifying restrictions implied by the model of
dynamic optimization in the absence of quantity constraints are rejected
by virtually all of the estimates. The estimated utility function
parameters always imply implausible behavior. We can conclude that the
data strongly reject specifications of the type used in this paper. In
this final section, we examine a number of alternative explanations for
the results obtained. The abundance of plausible explanations for the
results we obtained (or for other results that might have been obtained)—46—
leads us to be somewhat skeptical of the power of aggregate time series
data in distinguishing alternative macroeconomic hypotheses.
A first possibility is that our poor results are a consequence of
problems of measurement and estimation. As emphasized in the inItial
discussion of the data, our measures of consumption and leisure are all
open to question, as is our proxy for real returns. Probably wore
serious is the use of seasonally adjusted data. Seasonal fluctuations,
which account for most of the variance in leisure, should be explained by
dynamic optimization rather than averaged out as in our data. Utility
presumably depends on actual consumption not on consumption as adjusted
by X—ll. Time aggregation issues are possibly serious as well.
A second, more likely possibility is that the auxiliary asôumptions
we maintain to make the problem tractable are false. Aggregation in
models of this type is very problematic. It is also possible that our
assumption of additive separability across time is the root of the
problem. Over some intervals, this assumption is unwarranted. People
who have worked hard want to rest. Mealtimes are not staggered through
the day by accident. How serious these types of effects are at the macro
level remains an open question. Clark and Summers (1979) examine several
types of evidence bearing on the effects of previous employment
experience on subsequent experience, and conclude that habit formation,
-andpersistence effects predominate over intertemporal substitution
effects. This suggests that while non—separability may help to explain
the failure of our results, the sign of the key cross derivatives may—47—
well be the opposite of that usually assumed in intertemporal
substitution theories. Note that this problem of non—separable utility
in consumption relates closely to the issues connected with
distinguishing between consumption and consumption expenditure.
A third general class of explanation for the results we obtained
involves changing tastes. Just as the identification of traditional
demand curves depends on the predominance of technological shocks
relative to taste shocks, identification in models of the type estimated
here depends on the maintained hypothesis of constant tastes. This is
clearly a fiction. In every arena where taste shocks are easy to
disentangle, fashion being an obvious example, they are pervasive. Even
if the tastes of individuals were stable over time, the tastes of
individuals of different ages differ, and the age distribution
represented by the representative consumer has changed through time. An
important topic for future research is the estimation of models which
allow for changing tastes) either through random shocks, or endogenously
on the basis of experience. The latter possibility relates closely to
the problem of non—separability in the utility function.
A final possible reason for the failure of the model is thatthe
assumption that individuals are unconstrained in the labor and capital
markets is false. While fully satisfactory theories of wage rigidity
have not been developed, the observed data suggest that wages are in fact
rigid. The apparently large effects of sharp nominal contractions that
have been observed in repeated historic episodes support this view.—48—
Analyses of the macro character of unemployment, such as Clark and
Summers (1979) and Akerlof and Main (1981), find that it is extremely
concentrated among relatively few individuals whose employment Is
strongly pro—cyclical. This tends to suggest a role for disequilibrium
in certain labor market segments in explaining cyclical fluctuations;
In sum, the results of this investigation are discouraging. We find
little evidence in favor of any of the models estimated here. In
particular, we conclude that taking account of leisure does not
rationalize the failure of previous models of consumption based on
intertemporal decision making.—49—
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Per Capita Consuujption of Nondurable Goods
1947 1 15.1181 15.3253 15.3145 15.0508
1948 1 14.9965 15.1193 14.9251 15.1231
1949 1 15.176 15.1679 15.0105 15.1684
1950 1 15.2864 15.397 15.6202 15.3359
1951. 1 15.7318 15.5684 15.8787 16.01
1952 1 15.8778 16.218 16.4036 16.5468
1953 1 16.5085 16.5194 16.3525 16.2695
1954 1 16.2964 16.1772 16.3403 16.5462
1955 1 16.6223 16.835 16.9179 17.2254
1956 1 17.342 17.2493 17.2076 17.2753
1957 1 17.2842 17.3054 17.4953 17.3392
1958 1 17.0793 17.1669 17.4182 17.5529
195? 1 17.7135
.17.7698 17.7844 17.8401
1960 1 17.7538 17.9004 17.7241 17.6619
1961 1 17.7245 17.8361 17.7898 18.0217
1962 1 18.1356 18.144 18.2191 18.241
1963 1 18.2095 18.2046 18.2686 18.1997
1964 1 18.4467 18.6952 18.9275 18.8923
1965 1 19.0122 19.0697 19.2591 19.8004
1966 1 19.8806 19.9736 20.0571 19.8963
1967 1 20.0165 2O.0267 19.9361 19.9453
1968 1 20.2717 20.4233 20.6881 20.5674
1969 1 20.6554 20.6685 20.6322 20.6068
1970 1 20.6915 20.6665 20.7158 20.7679
1971 1 20.7305 20.6905 20.5826 20.6065
1972 1 20.5418 20.9292 21.1102 21.3195
1973 1 21.4016 21.0774 21.0711 20.8738
1974 1 20.5617 20.4624 20.4872 20.1342
1975 1 20.2005 20.4478 20.4365 20.4243
1976 1 20.7229 20.8821 21.0148 21.1827
1977 1 21.2164 21.2692 21.306 21.6011
1978 1 21.5059 21.5881 21.8042 22.1046
1979 1 21.8658 21.7538 21.9646 22.2214
1980 1 22.1486 21.7699 21.5778 21.8319
1981 1 22.0082
A-iPrice Deflator for Nondurable Goods
1947 1 57.3 57.8 58.9 60.8
1948 1 61.7 62.3 62.9 62.2
1949 1 61.3 60.5 59.8 59.5
1950 1 59.2 59.6 61.4 62.7
1951 1 65.3 65.8 65.6 66.4
1952 1 66.5 66.3 66.5 66.8
1953 1 66.4 66.2 66.3 66.3
1954 1 66.6 66.9 66.6 66.4
1955 1 66.4. 66.3 66.3 66.2
1956 1 66.4 67. 67.7 68.
1957 1 68.6 69. 69.8 70.
1958 1 71.1 71.2 71. 70.8
1959 1 71. 71.2 71.6 71.9
1960 1 71.8 72.4 72.7 73.3
1961 1 73.4 73.1 73.3 73.3
1962 1 73.6 73.9 74. 74.3
1963 1 74.6 74.6 75.1 75.3
1964 1 75.7 75.7 75.9 76.1
1965 1 76.3 77.2 77.6 78.
1966 1 79.1 79.9 80.4 81.1
1967 1 81.1 81.4 82.2 82.9
1968 1 83.9 84.8 85.6 86.7
1969 1 87.5 88.8 90. 91.3
1970 1 92.5 93.3 93.9 94.9
1971 1 95.2 96.2 97.1 97.9
1972 1 98.8 99.3 100.2 101.6
1973 1 103.7 106.8 109.5 113.1
1974 1 118.1 121.8 124.7 . 127.9
1975 1 129.2 130.5 133.6 135.1
1976 1 135.5 136. 137.5 138.9
1977 1 141. 142.8 144.1 145.8
1978 1 148.3 152. 154.5 157.9
1979 1 162.9 167.3 172.1 176.9
1980 1 182.9 186.2 190. 195.2
1981 1 199.2
A-2per Capita Consumptionof Nondurabies and Services
1947 1 27.0029 21:3062 27.1868 26.8148
1948 1 26.9505 27.214 27.0903 27.3367
1949 1 27.3652 27.386 27.1353 27.2766
1950 1 27.5666 28.031 28.3958 28.2527
1951 1 28.7838 28.7001 29.068 29.1406
1952 1 29.1059 29.5682 29.8571 30.1201
1953 1 30.0547 30.1821 30.0416 29.7926
1954 1 29.9176 30.015 30.3785 30.6358
1955 1 30.8897 31.117 31.2747 31.8062
1956 1 32.0184 32.0416 32.1406 32.3319
1957 1 32.3915 32.4693 32.639 32.5904
1958 1 32.3107 32.6322 33.019 33.133
1959 1 33.5295 33.7377 33.8374 34.076
1960 1 34.0298 34.3475 34.1464 34.1734
1961 1 34.3721 34.6965 34.6233 35.1102
1962 1 35.3157 35.507 35.6257 35.7823
1963 1 35.7425 35.8456 36.1736 36.2563
1964 1 36.6544 37.0887 37.4717 37.5782
1965 1 37.8054 38.0212 38.3663 39.1592
1966 1 39.3288 39.5447 39.7669 39.7728
1967 1 40.1126 40.2875 40.3474 40.384
1968 1 40.7918 41.2242 41.698 41.7105
1969 1 41.9194, 42.0941 42.1803 42.3201
1970 1 42.4848 42.4352 42.6205 42.6579
1971 1 42.7321 42.8002 42.7457 42.951
1972 1 43.0162 43.5023 43.8326 44.3231
1973 1 44.4612 44.2454 44.4331 44.2535
1974 1 43.8722 43.8509 43.919 43.6346
1975 1 43.769 44.225 44.2163 44.3262
1976 1 44.8178 45.0625 45.4028 45.8958
1977 1 46.0542 46.0632 46.4386 46.9381
1978 1 47.1251 47.4466 47.9977 48.3231
1979 1 48.3156 48.2977 48.6142 48.9341
1980 1 48.8883 48.4233 48.5246 48.9224
1981 1 49.112
A-3Price Deflator for Nondurables and Services
1947 1 49.9491 50.4322 51.6095 53.0329
1948 1 53.585 54.1288 54.7721 54.6497
1949 1 54.258 53.9437 53.7245 53.8191
1950 1 53.721 53.8755 55.1427 56.0682
1951 1 57.9071 58.346 58.575 59.4619
1952 1 59.7286 59.9384 60.3772 60.8081
1953 1 60.9484 61.0859 61.5166 61.853
1954 1 62.186 62.3357 62.2583 62.351
1955 1 62.474 62.5815 62.766 62.9458
1956 1 63.2367 63.722 64.2632 64.6447
1957 1 65.2428 65.6396 66.4104 66.7693
1958 1 67.5642 67.6959 67.8354 67.9774
1959 1 68.1692 68.5026 69.1316 69.5184
1960 1 69.6958 70.1506 70.4884 70.9805
1961 1 71.0762 71.0111 71.3072 71.4017
1962 1 71.7514 72.0895 72.338 72.6342
1963 1 72.9807 73.0737 73.4664 73.7065
1964 1 74.0112 74.1121 74.3656 74.658
1965 1 74.9088 75.5558 76.0066 76.4681
1966 1 77.2703 78.018 78.6162 79.25
1967 1 79.4972 79.8916 80.5811 81.28
1968 1 82.3401 83.1348 83.887 84.9257
1969 1 85.8765 87.0695 88.2115 89.4009
1970 1 90.5503 91.5047 92.4096 93.6678
1971 1 94.4275 95.5282 96.7369 97.6398
1972 1 98.6432 99.4038 100.355 101.548
1973 1 103.13 105.333 107.292 109.824
1974 1 113.423 116.413 119.149 121.868
1975 1 123.601 125.069 127.577 129.493
1976 1 130.662 131.868 133.686 135.83
1977 1 138.303 140.539 142.585 144.558
1978 1 146.832 150.147 152.808 156.11
1979 1 160.053 163.232 167.275 171.714
1980 1 176.719 180.586 184.613 189.164
1981 1 193.24
A-4Per CapitaHours Worked Per Week
1948 1 24.4081 24.5651 24.5377 24.4427
1949 1 23.9676 23.7894 23.3321 23.3202
1950 1 23.3794 23.6307 24.0283 24.0508
1951 1 24.3355 24.3792 24.5267 24.219
1952 1 24.4683 24.1751 24.0549 24.3893
1953 1 24.5186 24.2007 24.1054 23.7828
1954 1 23.4174 23.0957 22.859 22.9464
1955 1 23.3124 23.3365 23.8715 23.9023
1956 1 23.9133 23.9242 23.9617 23.8341
1957 1 23.7526 23.5422 23.472 23.0542
1958 1 22.5518 22.4383 22.4046 22.7434
1959 1 22.7784 23.046 22.8695 22.7777
1960 1 22.6122 23.0295 22.9992 22.7056
1961 1 22.5141 22.3225 22.312 22.5442
1962 1 22.5202 22.6517. 22.5588 22.4623
1963 1 22.394 22.5329 22.4491 22.4778
1964 1 22.3338 22.6493 22.4657 22.5526
1965 1 22.7423 22.8232 22.8428 23.0068
1966 1 22.9991 23.0685 23.0833 23.098
1967 1 23.0906 23.0241 23.2083 23.2011
1968 1 23.0192 23.1808 23.209 23.1812
1969 1 23.1054 23.2199 23.2648 23.181
1970 1 22.9715 22.8039 22.6012 22.4735
1911 1 22.3341 22.2897 22.1942 22.3522
1972 1 22.3958 22.4593 22.5155 22.5196
1973 1 22.6198 22.8116 22.8589. 22.9457
1974 1 22.8261 22.7511 22.6516 22.3101
1975 1 21.7893 21.6395 21.6866. 21.8196
1976 1 22.0321 22.0682 22.0907 22.1806
1977 1 22.242 22.5613 22.5659 22.7518
1976 1 22.8953. 23.4821 23.232 23.4287
1979 1 23.5041 23.4095 23.4278 23.5442
1980 1 23.3296 22.828 22.6608 22.8242
1981 1 22.9808
A-5After Tax Compensation of Nonagricultural Employees
1947 1 1.05326 1.10046 1.13768 1.18948
1948 1 1.21603 1.23419 1.27342 1.29148
1949 1 1.30153 1.31132 1.31423 1.31586
1950 1 1.33078 1.33066 1.34682 1.37884
1951 1 1.40515 1.43341. 1.451 1.47696
1952 1 1.49488 1.51599 1.53447 1.55827
1953 1 1.56917 1.5982 1.61918 1.62939
1954 1 1.65201 1.66946 1.68607 1.69902
1955 1 1.70366 1.71949 1.74195 1.76021
1956 1 1.7821 1.81156 1.83736 1.85406
1957 1 1.89364 1.9061 1.92462 1.94462
1958 1 1.9576 1.98855 2.02892 2.03
1959 1 2.04334 2.05373 2.06949 2.08253
1960 1 2.11673 2.13069 2.13757 2.14798
1961 1 2.16017 2.16996 2.18371 2.2094
1962 1 2.24817 2.25636 2.26386 2.27576
1963 1 2.28977 2.29257 2.31895 2.37195
1964 1 2.44614 2.48961 2.54119 2.5627
1965 1 2.56812 2.59016 2.61571 2.64181
1966 1 2.66183 2.6933 2.7381 2.76705
1967 1 2.80463 2.83 2.85374 2.87796
1968 1 2.91771 2.94134 2.96778 3.00251
1969 1 3.03294 3.07656 3.14362 3.20135
1970 1 3.26616 3.34898 3.4403 3.44999
1971 1 3.52528 3.57353 3.62174 3.65462
1972 1 3.75025 3.78711 3.83014 3.8815
1973 1 3.95776 3.98998 4.03862 4.11371
1974 1 4.18268 4.29485 4.38762 4.4963
1975 1 4.61002 4.6968 4.78804 4.87599
1976 1 4.96132 5.07213 5.14693 5.24567
1977 1 5.33795 5.42641 5.50795 5.61742
1978 1 5.71794 5.79717 5.90583 6.03649
1979 1 6.1863 6.34586 6.43757 6.59069
1980 1 6.71842 6.87616 7.03934 7.23279
A-6After Tax Nominal Interest Rate on Treasury Bills
1947 1 1.00066 1.00066 1.00126 1.00158
1948 1 1.00172 1.00174 1.00181 1.00198
1949 1 1.00203 1.00202 1.00178 1.00187
1950 1 1.00195 1.00203 1.00215 1.00236
1951 1 1.00244 1.00267 1.00284 1.00287
1952 1 1.00286 1.00292 1.00319 1.00335
1953 1 1.00356 1.00383 1.00352 1.00259
1954 1 1.00189 1.00142 1.00152 1.00181
1955 1 1.00219 1.00264 1.00324 1.00409
1956 1 1.00414 1.00451 1.00451 1.00532
1957 1 1.0055 1.00548 1.00587 1.0058
1958 1 1.0032 1.00178 1.00298 1.00484
1959 1 1.00486 1.00524 1.00613 1.00744
1960 1 1.00683
:1.00537 1.00416 1.00411
1961 1 1.00413 1.00404 1.00404 1.0043
1962 1 1.00476 1.00472 1.00496 1.00487
1963 1 1.00505 1.00511 1.00569 1.006b7
1964 1 1.00613 1.00604 1.00608 1.00639
1965 1 1.00676 1.00672 1.00669 1.0072
1966 1 1.00801 1.00795 1.00872 1.00906
1967 1 1.00784 1.00634 1.00752 1.00827
1968 1 1.00875 1.00951 1.00902 1.00963
1969 1 1.01057 1.01075 1.01211 1.01257
1970 1 1.01247 1.01161 1.01097 1.00925
1971 1 1.00669 1.00728 1.00872 1.00733
1972 1 1.00596 1.0065 1.00734 1.00838
1973 1 1.00973 1.01137 1.01437 1.01281
1974 1 1.01304 1.01416 1.0142 1.0126
1975 1 1.01012 1.00932 1.01091 1.0098
1976 1 1.00856 1.00892 1.00892 1.00812
1977 1 1.008 1.00834 1.00944 1.01057
1978 1 1.01103 1.01115 1.01256 1.01486
1979 1 1.01599 1.01601 1.01644 1.02005
1980 1 1.02276 1.01714 1.01578 1.02317
1981 1 1.02425
A-7